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ABSTRACT: In recent years, the EU competition framework has been under strain 
because of the increasing market interconnectivity. Criticisms have increased 
regarding the EU competition enforcement model. In response, institutional debate 
and measures have focused on the enhancement of fairness in this area of EU law. 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, another source of “fairness” in the 
enforcement of EU competition law is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Article 47 of the EU Charter is the most invoked provision in the context of EU com-
petition litigation. Considered to reaffirm the EU general principle of effective judicial 
protection, this article constitutionalises the right to an effective remedy and to a fair 
trial. Although the existing literature has highlighted the overall influence of funda-
mental rights in the enforcement of competition law, the contribution of Article 47 of 
the Charter to the enhancement of fairness in EU competition policies, as interpreted 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union, remains underexplored.
The current article aims to fill this gap in the literature by offering a threefold input. 
First, the article situates the discussion on fairness in EU competition law in the 
broader philosophical debate regarding various conception(s) of fairness. Second, the 
article analyses the case law of the EU Court of Justice on Article 47 of the EU Charter 
in EU competition litigation. Finally, the article discusses what kind of “fairness” 
Article 47 strengthens in the area of EU competition law enforcement.
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the growing market interconnectivity has posed new 
challenges to the effective enforcement of EU competition law.1 The exist-
ing legal framework has been considered only relatively successful to 
address these issues.2 As a result, institutional debate3 has focused on the 
enhancement of fairness in the enforcement of EU competition rules. For 
instance, Commissioner Vestager has consistently cited fairness as one 
of the principles that should guide the application of the EU competition 
framework.4 The attention to fairness in the competition sector should not, 
however, come as a surprise. Indeed, fairness is all around EU competi-
tion law: Articles 101 and 102 TFEU refer in various ways to the concept 
of “fairness”.
Although the precise meaning of fairness in EU competition law is con-
troversial, in recent years, multiple initiatives have attempted to enhance 
fairness in that area of law. For example, in 2012, extensive discussions 
on procedural fairness in the competition field were initiated by, among 
others, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.5 
Fairness considerations also led to the adoption of soft law instruments6 
such as the Commission’s notice on best practices for proceedings under 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This measure seeks to increase the understand-
ing of the Commission’s investigation processes and “ensure a high degree 
1 Felipe González and Stanley Hoffmann, “European Union and globalization”, Foreign Policy, no. 
115 (1999): 28.
2 Ian Forrester recalls a speech given in 1982 concerning a plea for reform of the EC competi-
tion system. Ian Forrester, “Modernization of EC competition law”, Fordham International Law 
Journal 23, no. 4 (2000): 1028.
3 Johannes Laitenberger “Fairness in EU competition law enforcement”, British Chambers of 
Commerce EU & Belgium, 20 June 2018, https://bit.ly/335se2Q.
4 E.g. Margarethe Vestager, “Fairness and competition”, Brussels GCLC Annual Conference, 25 
January 2018, https://bit.ly/3i4sxBc.
5 OECD Competition Committee, “Procedural fairness and transparency”, 2012, https://bit.
ly/3bsBcuY; WTO, “Competition policy, trade and the global economy: Existing WTO elements, 
commitments in regional trade agreements, current challenges and issues for reflection”, 31 
October 2018, https://bit.ly/3h3rZue.
6 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/72/EC Concerning Common Rules for the 
Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, 13 July 2009.
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of transparency and predictability in the process”.7 Further, academics 
have reflected on the fairness of fines imposed on companies,8 whereas 
the public debate has highlighted the fairness considerations prompting 
recent investigations against big tech giants.9
Another source of “fairness” in the field of EU competition law is the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.10 The Charter offers the first official cata-
logue of fundamental rights protected in the EU and binds the EU and the 
Member States when they implement EU law.11 Charter rights are thus an 
expression of constitutionalised fairness in the EU legal order.
It is well established that legal orders where basic liberties and rights are 
not envisaged would not be characterised by justice and, therefore, fair-
ness. By protecting interests considered “essential” in a society, fundamen-
tal rights are a form of legal entitlement and offer individual guarantees 
against unjustified interferences reducing the enjoyment of that entitle-
ment. Additionally, the EU legal order is based on fairness considerations. 
EU Treaty freedoms provide individuals in the EU with “essential rights”.12 
Moreover, through the case law of the Court of Justice,13 the EU order has 
been enriched with fundamental rights in the form of the general princi-
ples of EU law. The entry into force of the EU Charter in 2009 evidently 
marked a further step in the advancement of fairness aspirations in the EU 
legal system. EU fundamental rights have, in fact, acquired a more pre-
scriptive and defined content thanks to the Charter. The judicial applica-
tion of the Charter in the context of EU competition litigation contributes 
to ensuring “fairness” in that sector as well.
7 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU. 
8 Arianna Andreangeli, “Competition law and fundamental rights”, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 8, no. 8 (2017): 524.
9 E.g. “Apple can’t ignore antitrust outcry. Here’s a game plan”, Bloomberg, 22 June 2020, https://
bloom.bg/3hY0bZv.
10 See Article 6 TEU.
11 Article 51 of the EU Charter.
12 Nik J. de Boer, “Fundamental rights and the EU internal market: Just how fundamental are the 
EU treaty freedoms? A normative enquiry based on John Rawls’ political philosophy”, Utrecht Law 
Review 9, no. 1 (2013): 149. 
13 Hereafter, “CJEU”, which indicates, collectively, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and the 
General Court “GC”. 
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Article 47 of the EU Charter14 (“Article 47 Charter” or “Article 47”), pro-
tecting the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial, is the most cited 
Charter right in the EU competition litigation. This provision has become 
the primus inter pares among the Charter rights in the competition field. 
The question thus arises: What is the contribution of Article 47 in enhanc-
ing fairness in the enforcement of EU competition law?
The current article addresses this question and is structured as fol-
lows. First, it conducts a literature review of the conceptions of “fairness” 
in the field of EU competition law, also in the light of the broader legal-
philosophical debate on “fairness”. The article then moves on to analysing 
the CJEU case law on Article 47 Charter as applied in EU competition 
litigation. Finally, the article discusses what kind of “fairness” Article 47 
strengthens in the area of EU competition law enforcement.
2. Notions of fairness: A conceptual discussion
The ever-evolving notion of fairness is omnipresent in legal theory and 
most fields of law. Two types of notion of fairness may be traced: substan-
tive and procedural. As will be discussed below, substantive and proce-
dural fairness acquire different nuances, in both literature and various 
areas of law.
To begin with, substantive fairness does not have a univocal defini-
tion. As its roots, legal philosophers have identified the ideals of justice 
and equality. Because of the variability of just outcomes in different legal 
systems and policy sectors, there is no unique meaning that can be attrib-
uted to substantive fairness. However, what joins the different conceptions 
of this type of fairness is that they all aspire to achieve policy objectives 
acceptable to and benefitting the community of reference.
Rawls developed one of the most debated notions of substantive fair-
ness.15 In Rawls’ reconstruction, fairness is intrinsically linked with jus-
tice from a distributional point of view. Namely, fairness requires equita-
ble distribution of gain. Other theorists have conceptualised substantive 
fairness from an efficiency angle. Fairness as efficiency applies mainly in 
negotiations, where the risks will be allocated to the party who can bear 
14 Article 47 appears in 122 judgments delivered in the field of competition litigation from the 1st of 
December 2010 until 30 April 2020. See https://bit.ly/2GynSKa. In the same timeframe, Article 41 
of the EU Charter figures in 82 cases. See https://bit.ly/3btHcDP.
15 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard College Press, 2005).
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them at the least cost.16 This latter conception of fairness takes into account 
the situation of individuals in theorising the distribution of rights and 
obligations.
Substantive fairness aspirations are enshrined in various areas of law, 
such as employment,17 contract,18 and administrative law. In these fields, 
fairness is both an objective and a principle, used to recalibrate imbal-
anced situations such as those between an employer and the employee. In 
UK administrative law, substantive justice (or fairness) is a legal ground 
for scrutinising administrative decisions. Such standards include the prin-
ciple of equality19 and ensure the balancing of individual rights against the 
administration.20
In its procedural meaning, instead, fairness regulates the participatory 
rights of entities involved in decision-making procedures. From this angle, 
the focus of fairness is not the outcome of decisions, but rather the way in 
which agreement is reached. There is also the belief that procedural fair-
ness leads to “better” decision-making, in the sense that final agreements 
are more democratic and representative. Procedural fairness considera-
tions may apply in relation to any sort of system or procedure, legislative 
or judicial.
The implications of procedural fairness have been widely studied. 
For instance, Tyler21 observed that procedural fairness significantly 
contributes to the acceptance of the regulatory model in a legal order. 
Furthermore, Sustein22 has identified two notions of procedural fairness: 
“the first, embodied in the rule of law ideal, calls for clear rules, laid down 
in advance and susceptible to mechanical application in individual cases. 
16 Frank H. Buckley, “Three theories of substantive fairness”, Hofstra Law Review 19, no. 1 (1990): 35.
17 Ioannis Lianos, Nicola Countouris and Valerio de Stefano, “Re-thinking the competition law/
labour law interaction: Promoting a fairer labour market”, European Labour Law Journal 10, no. 
3 (2019): 291-333.
18 Buckley, “Three theories”.
19 David J. Mullan, “Natural justice and fairness – Substantive as well as procedural standards for 
the review of administrative decision-making?”, Revue de Droit de McGill 27, no. 2 (1981): 287.
20 Kaplow and Shavell similarly argue that supporting any notion of fairness will result in lowering 
the overall wellbeing of a community. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “The Conflict between 
notions of fairness and the pareto principle”, American Law and Economics Review 1, no. 1/2 
(2000).
21 Tom R. Tyler, “Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law”, Crime and Justice 30 
(2003): 283-327.
22 Cass R Sunstein, “Two conceptions of procedural fairness”, Social Research: An International 
Quarterly 73, no. 2 (2006): 619.
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The second calls for a high degree of individuation, on the theory that fair-
ness requires particularized consideration of the whole person”. These two 
conceptions are not sharply different but are part of a continuum.
To conclude, procedural and substantive fairness are complementary: 
for a system to be fair, all individuals should have the same opportuni-
ties to equitable rights and gains and should benefit, in principle, from the 
same participatory guarantees in decision-making processes. Procedural 
fairness reinforces substantive fairness and vice-versa.
As discussed in the following section, significant academic debate sur-
rounds the role of both substantive and procedural fairness in the EU 
competition sector.
2.1. Fairness in EU competition law 
In the latest speeches of Competition Commissioner Vestager, fairness 
is omnipresent.23 For example, in 2016, she24 stressed that “competition 
enforcement also sends a message of fairness. That public authorities are 
here to defend the interests of individuals, not just to take care of big 
corporations”.25 The recent focus on the enhancement of fairness in the EU 
competition sector emerged following criticisms practitioners26 and schol-
ars27 raised. Among the critics, there is overall agreement that the role of 
“fairness” in competition rules should be furthered. The competition law 
debate beyond the Atlantic also influenced the attention on fairness in the 
23 E.g. Margarethe Vestager, “Fairness and competition” and “Technology with purpose”, 5 March 
2020, https://bit.ly/333xOCS.
24 Margrethe Vestager, “Address at the 10th Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: 
Competition for a fairer society”, 20 September 2016, https://bit.ly/2F5PmGn.
25 In Vestager’s view, fairness is the social rationale of competition principles. It involves the balanc-
ing of business incentives while ensuring that consumers retain the possibility to arbitrate between 
competition options. See Damien Gerard, “Fairness in EU competition policy: Significance and 
implications”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9, no. 4 (2018): 211.
26 Cfr. Aidan O’Neill, “Competition law and fundamental rights: Some unresolved issues”, May 
2011, https://bit.ly/2F1CkKe. 
27 Jamie Flattery “Balancing efficiency and justice in EU competition law: Elements of procedural 
fairness and their impact on the right of a fair hearing”, The Competition Law Review 7, no. 1 
(2010); D. Daniel Sokol and Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust Procedural Fairness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2019). Flattery has observed that the rules applicable in EU competition proceed-
ings fell short of EU human rights standards in terms of procedural guarantees. Sokol further 
argued that the “movement to create global best practices had been at a slow pace”. See https://bit.
ly/32cXdec.
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EU competition field. In 2016, Hesse,28 acting US assistant attorney gen-
eral, stated that “the ultimate goal of antitrust [is] economic fairness”.
Fairness is not a new concept in EU competition law. The very word-
ing of Article 101 TFEU saves from invalidity any agreements or decisions 
between undertakings “allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit”, with the conditions that the undertakings are not subject to 
unnecessary restrictions and that competition is eliminated. Additionally, 
Article 102 TFEU links the notion of abuse of dominant position to “unfair 
prices29 and trading conditions”. What precisely fairness under the Treaty 
provisions refers to has been extensively discussed in the literature.
As Edwards observed in 1967, the presence of fairness as a concept guid-
ing the EU competition system reflects the trust in public powers typical of 
European society. In Europe, “Public policy toward restrictions is focused 
upon fairness in dividing what the economy produces rather than enlarge-
ment of product”.30 More specifically, Amato highlighted that the French, 
Italian, and German dirigiste traditions highly influenced the European 
competition regulatory model. Under these traditions, the co-operation of 
undertakings for the pursuit of a public interest was superior to pure com-
petition as such.31 From this perspective, the idea of ensuring “neutral” 
competition in the market was contrary to the traditional role of public 
authority in ensuring fairness.
Zimmer32 provides further insights into the notion of fairness in the 
competition field. He describes substantive fairness in EU competition law 
as concerning not only the consumers but also other players in the market. 
From his viewpoint, fairness “has a lot to do with the fundamental princi-
ple of non-discrimination which is at the basis of most legal systems. The 
importance of this principle in law probably explains why, even though 
28 Renata Hesse, “And never the twain shall meet? Connecting popular and professional visions for 
antitrust enforcement”, 20 September 2016, https://bit.ly/2GzZ4kX.
29 E.g. Judgment of 14 September 2017, Biedrība Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju 
aģentūra, C177/16, EU:C:2017:689, paragraphs 31 and ff.
30 C. D. Edwards, Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An International Comparison (Dobbs 
Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1967) at 22-3, cited in Hanns Ullrich, The Evolution of European 
Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition? (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2006).
31 Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the 
History of the Market (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997).
32 Daniel Zimmer, The Goals of Competition Law (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2012), 74 and ff.
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it might not always be justified from a purely economic perspective, the 
Commission and the Courts remain critical of discriminatory practices”.
Padilla33 is of the same view as Zimmer and argues that fairness is at 
the core of EU competition law. For Padilla, fairness comes in the form of 
dispersion of power, which ensures that bigger companies cannot unduly 
hamper the commercial activities of small-sized competitors.34
The considered authors thus underline that substantive fairness is not 
merely an intrinsic concept of EU competition rules, but also its ultimate 
objective. Substantive fairness in EU competition law is not only about 
market efficiency, but also social justice and, therefore, distribution mecha-
nisms in favour of those in weaker positions, be they consumers or smaller 
companies. Overall, the substantive notion of fairness in EU competition 
law appears highly influenced by distributional justice theories, similar to 
those Rawls developed.
However, contrasting views concerning the role of fairness in the com-
petition sector may be traced in the literature. Other authors have indeed 
discredited substantive fairness in this sector and have advocated for a 
conceptualisation of this objective in procedural terms. 
For economic efficiency purists, bearers of the core values of the Chicago 
and Post-Chicago Schools, “the term ‘fair’ is nothing short of the anti-
trust f word”.35 These scholars argue that contaminating antitrust with 
fairness considerations would amount to “undesirable arbitrariness in 
enforcement”.36 Similarly, Nazzini37 makes the point that competition law 
is only interested with procedural fairness because it does not look at the 
outcome but at how the outcome has been reached.
33 Christian Ahlborn and A. Jorge Padilla, “From fairness to welfare: Implications for the assess-
ment of unilateral conduct under EC competition law”, in European Competition Law Annual 
2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, ed. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008).
34 Substantive fairness in competition law has been theorised in the United States as well by two 
schools: the discretionalists and the New Brandesians. For a detailed account, see Sandra Marco 
Colino, “The antitrust F word: Fairness Considerations in competition law”, Social Science Research 
Network, 2018, https://bit.ly/2Gd65I4. “plainCitation”:”Sandra Marco Colino, ‘The Antitrust F 
Word: Fairness Considerations in Competition Law’ (Social Science Research Network 2018
35 Marco Colino, “The antitrust F word””plainCitation”:”Sandra Marco Colino, ‘The Antitrust F 
Word: Fairness Considerations in Competition Law’ (Social Science Research Network 2018.
36 Ibid, 8-9.
37 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and 
Principles of Article 102 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 22-23.
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Sokol has identified two central elements of procedural fairness in the 
competition field: transparency and due process.38 When competition 
authorities respect procedural fairness concerns, they create legitimacy 
“for the competition policy system overall. As a result, strong procedural 
fairness safeguards force parties to win cases based on the facts and eco-
nomic evidence”.39 Furthermore, stressing the importance of procedural 
fairness in the competition sector, Arena suggests that procedural fairness 
should be the minimum threshold for international transplants in the field 
of competition law.40
In light of this discussion, two observations arise. First, whereas schol-
arship is divided on the meaning and role of fairness in competition law, 
EU primary sources seem to refer to a substantive conception of fairness. 
Substantive fairness in the competition field ultimately relates to the 
achievement of a market in which companies and consumers are coop-
erating to achieve overall wealth in a fair manner. Fairness is pivotal for a 
pluralistic market, where companies shall not exploit dominant positions 
and consumers can efficiently use their financial resources. In the years to 
come, substantive fairness in EU competition law may become more com-
plex and, ultimately, polycentric to incorporate the recent objectives of EU 
competition policies.41
Second, procedural fairness plays a significant role in EU competition 
law, as extensive scholarship debates and numerous regulatory initiatives 
of the EU institutions testify. Among the latter, we can cite the adoption of 
the 2006 guidelines on the fixing of penalties42 and the 2011 Commission 
guidelines on procedural guarantees for parties.43
Substantive and procedural fairness in competition law should thus 
reinforce each other: the enforcement of competition rules should seek to 
achieve a fair market as defined above, relying on procedural guarantees for 
38 D Daniel Sokol, “The new procedural fairness in competition law: Global developments”, Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice 10, no. 4 (2019): 197.
39 Ibid, 197.
40 Amedeo Arena, “The emergence of a WTO Antitrust jurisprudence through cross-fertilization 
from other international antitrust institutions: The case for procedural fairness as a necessary 
precondition”, in Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, ed. Paul Nihoul and Tadeusz 
Skonczny (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 108 and ff.
41 Ioannis Lianos, “Polycentric competition law”, Current Legal Problems 71, no. 1 (2018).
42 Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No. 1/2003.
43 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU.
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the parties involved in the decision-making process. The following institu-
tions are central in the attainment of substantive and procedural fairness 
in the EU competition field: the Commission, which identifies violations 
and sanctions them; and the national and EU courts, which ensure com-
pliance with EU law – including EU fundamental rights – in the context 
of infringement proceedings and judicial actions. Notably, the EU courts 
bear on their shoulders the challenging duty of ensuring the achievement 
of the EU competition objectives laid down in the Treaties, while further-
ing fairness in the EU in the light of the supreme values and norms of that 
order. These latter rules also include the Charter of fundamental rights, 
which currently has the same value as the Treaties.44 Charter rights thus 
contribute to the strengthening of substantive and procedural fairness in 
the EU competition sector.
3.  Article 47 of the European Union Charter in the field of European 
Union competition law: how does it contribute to the enhancement 
of fairness in the enforcement of competition law?
The application of fundamental rights in the competition field has been 
extensively studied. Scholars have discussed the relatively limited or sig-
nificant influence of fundamental rights in the enforcement of EU compe-
tition rules, and, in particular, the role of the CJEU in interpreting them.45 
Authors46 agreed on the evident preponderance of procedural-related fun-
damental rights in the context of EU antitrust litigation and their positive 
impact on shaping procedural guarantees. However, the growing applica-
tion of Article 47 Charter and its contribution to ensuring fairness in com-
petition enforcement remains understudied to date. As it will subsequently 
44 See Article 6 TEU.
45 Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, “Effectiveness through fairness? ‘Due process’ as an institutional 
precondition for effective decentralized EU competition law enforcement”, 9th ASCOLA Conference 
Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, 2014, https://bit.ly/2F9qNZ7; 
Flattery, “Balancing efficiency”.
46 Flattery, “Balancing efficiency and justice in EU competition law”; Andreangeli, “Competition 
law”, Marco Bronckers and Anne Vallery “No longer presumed guilty? The impact of funda-
mental rights on certain dogmas of EU competition law”, World Competition 34, no. 4 (2011); 
Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2014). However, other authors underplay the effects of fundamental rights in the 
application of competition rules. See Albert Sanchez Graells and Francisco Marcos, “Human 
Rights protection for corporate antitrust defendants: Are we not going overboard?”, in Procedural 
Fairness in Competition Proceedings, ed. Paul Nihoul and Tadeusz Skoczny (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015). 
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be discussed, due to its multi-layered content, this Article contributes to 
the achievement of both procedural and substantive fairness.
Article 47 Charter enshrines the general principle of effective judicial 
protection,47 which stems from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States and Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.48 Article 47 grants 
the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial. The first part 
of the Article indicates that anyone whose rights deriving from EU law 
have been breached has the guarantee to an effective remedy under several 
conditions. First, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing that must 
be held within a reasonable time. Second, the hearing is to be organised by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Third, everyone 
has the right to be advised, defended and represented. Fourth, legal aid 
must be made available to those who lack sufficient resources.
Under Article 47 of the Charter, the right to an effective remedy and 
a fair trial are undoubtedly interconnected. However, from an analytical 
point of view, their objective and purpose are different. The right to a fair 
trial reflects a collection of procedural guarantees that allow individuals 
to ascertain and defend their right before courts. These procedural rights 
ensure the right to be heard by an impartial and independent tribunal. The 
right to an effective remedy grants an effective redress for the violation of 
rights. This latter right aims to achieve distributional justice objectives by 
ensuring that those wronged are restored in their rights and legal entitle-
ments. The right to an effective remedy is thus the consequence and the 
aspirational outcome of the right to a fair trial, and without a fair trial, an 
effective remedy cannot be obtained.
For a remedy to be effective, however, the procedural guarantees ensured 
by the right to a fair trial are not always sufficient. We can envisage cases in 
which all procedural rules have been respected but violations of rights or 
interests may not be effectively protected. An EU law textbook example is 
the case of procedural rules limiting judicial review of measures covering 
EU law matters. These were the circumstance of the well-known Johnston 
case.49 Mrs. Johnston could not obtain judicial review of an act issued by 
the UK Secretary of State that was contrary to EU discrimination rules. 
47 Judgment of 26 July 2017, Moussa Sacko v. Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della 
Protezione internazionale di Milano, C-348/16, EU:C:2017:591 paragraph 37.
48 Judgment of 15 May 1986, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, C-222/84, EU:C:1986:206.
49 Ibid.
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Courts in the UK were precluded under national law from reviewing such 
acts. Asked to interpret whether the UK rules at stake were compatible 
with EU law, the ECJ established that although it is up to the national sys-
tems to provide procedural rules to access courts, the effective protection 
of EU derived rights requires the possibility for discriminated individu-
als to obtain judicial review of administrative decisions before national 
courts. Johnston clearly indicates that the right to an effective remedy goes 
beyond the procedural guarantees of the right to a fair trial and focuses 
on granting a certain threshold of judicial protection to rights. Thus, on a 
systemic level, the right to an effective remedy requires that justice be done 
in cases of unlawful conduct violating rights and freedoms deriving from 
EU law.
Accordingly, while the right to a fair trial undoubtedly enhances pro-
cedural fairness in the context of the enforcement of EU competition law, 
the right to an effective remedy may contribute to substantive fairness in 
the competition field. From a procedural point of view, the right to a fair 
trial protected by Article 47 guarantees that the decisions achieved by the 
EU and national courts, as well as the Commission, are “procedurally 
sound”, i.e. the participatory rights of the parties are respected. From a 
substantive perspective, the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 
Charter contributes to effectively redressing violations of EU competition 
law and protects EU derived rights and interests. The right to an effective 
remedy thus becomes particularly important in the field of competition 
law, where individuals wronged by anti-competitive behaviours may be 
protected only ex-post, in particular, through judicial proceedings before 
EU or national courts.
We can identify six main areas in which Article 47 Charter has been 
applied by EU courts in the competition field:50 (a) locus standi and access 
to a court; (b) the scope of the judicial review by EU courts; (c) the review 
of penalties by the EU judicature; (d) the excessive duration of proceedings 
and effective remedies; (d) statement of reasons; (e) evidence. These areas 
will be discussed below to assess how Article 47 Charter has contributed 
to the enhancement of fairness in the enforcement of EU competition law.
50 This information is based on the case law research conducted: https://bit.ly/322UiEJ.
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(a) Locus standi and access to a court
In the context of the EU courts’ case law on competition matters parties 
have invoked Article 47 Charter to challenge the Plaumann test51 applied 
to assess the locus standi under Article 263 TFEU. However, the ECJ has 
consistently confirmed its established jurisprudence, whereby the “indi-
vidual concern” requirement is subject to a narrow interpretation and 
may not be relaxed to comply with fundamental rights. For instance, in 
Greenpeace,52 the ECJ recalled the division of competences between EU 
and national courts to ensure effective judicial protection. The Court 
stated that where individuals cannot lodge an action for annulment before 
EU courts, it remains the duty of Member States to offer a system ensur-
ing effective remedies in the fields covered by EU law.53 In particular,54 it is 
incumbent on the national judges applying EU competition rules to ensure 
not only their effectiveness but also the protection of the rights stemming 
therefrom.55
Article 47 was also interpreted as entitling both natural and legal per-
sons to bring proceedings before the GC under Article 263(4) TFEU in the 
absence of a specific legal basis. An interpretation supporting the opposite 
result would infringe the principle of effective judicial protection.56
Furthermore, Article 47 plays a central role in the private enforcement of 
competition rules before national courts. Interpreted jointly with Article 
101 TFEU, Article 47 enables individuals wronged by anticompetitive 
conducts to claim compensation for the damage suffered when there is 
a causal link between the said damage and an agreement or practice pro-
hibited by Article 101 TFEU.57 Article 47 requires national authorities to 
51 Judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission of the European Economic 
Communities, C-25/62 EU:C:1963:17.
52 Order of 10 October 2017, Greenpeace Energy eG v. European Commission, C-640/16 P, 
EU:C:2017:752, paragraphs 23 and ff.
53 See Judgment of 19 December 2013, Telefónica SA v. European Commission, C-274/12, 
EU:C:2013:852, paragraphs 56 and ff.
54 See Judgment of 16 December 2015, Martinair Holland NV. v. European Commission, T-67/11, 
EU:T:2015:984, paragraph 33.
55 Judgment of 6 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie and Others, C-536/11, 
EU:C:2013:366, paragraphs 21-22.
56 See Judgment of 5 September 2014, Éditions Odile Jacob SAS v. European Commission, T471/11, 
EU:T:2014:739, paragraph 136.
57 Judgment of 6 November 2012, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis and Others, C-199/11, 
EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 58.
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ensure that actions for damages following infringements of competition 
law provisions effectively redress the violations of competition law.58
(b) The scope of the judicial review by European Union Courts
The scope of judicial review under Article 263 TFEU impacts on the dis-
cretion left to the Commission and the possibility for private parties to 
access judicial protection before the GC. The implications of Article 47 are 
crucial in balancing the right to obtain effective judicial protection against 
the effectiveness of the Commission’s activities.59
In Otis,60 it was argued that the judicial review under Article 263 TFEU 
“is insufficient because of […] the margin of discretion [that] those Courts 
allow the Commission in economic matters”. This implied that the judicial 
review of EU courts was in breach of the right to an effective remedy under 
Article 47, as it devolved excessive decisional leeway to the Commission 
in economic matters. The ECJ found that the margin of discretion of the 
Commission concerning economic matters “does not mean that the EU 
Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation 
of information of an economic nature. Those Courts must […] not only 
establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the infor-
mation [that] must be taken into account […] to assess a complex situation 
and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from 
it”. It follows that, to comply with Article 47, EU courts must engage in 
a substantive review of the evidence used by the Commission and verify 
that the conclusion on the infringement could actually be inferred from 
the gathered evidence.61 The scrutiny of the evidence by the EU judica-
ture ensures that the Commission’s discretion to allege competition rules’ 
infringements is subject to limits.
58 The need for effective procedural remedies also flows from Art. 19(1) TEU. For an analysis of the 
private enforcement mechanisms in the competition field, see Sara Landini, “Private enforcement 
and market regulation”, Market and Competition Law Review II, no. 2 (2018): 53 and ff. 
59 Decisions of the GC may be challenged before the ECJ through the appeal procedure. The for-
mer court is solely competent to review the facts of the case, while on appeal the latter court car-
ries only a marginal review. Judgment of 19 December 2013, Siemens AG and Others v. European 
Commission, C-239/11, EU:C:2013:866, paragraph 41.
60 Judgment of 6 November 2012, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis and Others, C-199/11, 
EU:C:2012:684.
61 See below.
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Article 47 was also pivotal in extending the range of the Commission’s 
acts subject to judicial scrutiny. In Deutsche Ban,62 the appellant contested 
before the ECJ the decision of the GC on the ground of a misinterpre-
tation of the right to effective judicial protection. Notably, the appel-
lant criticised the GC for having considered the said right as respected 
because the Commission’s inspection decisions could only be challenged 
after the inspection occurred. In its judgment, the ECJ rejected this argu-
ment and found that the system of judicial review of the Commission’s 
decisions complied with Article 47. It recalled that the inspection deci-
sions of the Commission could be challenged immediately after the com-
pany has been notified with the inspection decision, without waiting for 
the Commission’s final decision. Where the EU judicature finds that the 
Commission has committed irregularity in the conduct of the investiga-
tion or if it annuls the inspection decision, any material or evidence gath-
ered during that investigation cannot be used against the company. Under 
this system, the EU courts ensure that the investigations and conduct of 
the Commission are procedurally sound while also protecting the proce-
dural guarantees of corporations.
The GC and ECJ have in some instances disagreed on what acts could be 
included within the scope of Article 263 TFEU. The Stichting Woonpunt 
case illustrates this tension.63 The GC had initially considered that the 
assessment of the Commission on the compatibility of aid pursuant to 
Articles 18 and 26 of Regulation 659/1999 remained outside the scope 
of the review of the EU courts. In this respect, the GC established that 
the Commission enjoyed a broad margin of discretion to determine the 
appropriate measures to address the incompatibility of an existing aid 
scheme with the internal market. As a result, the EU courts should carry 
a review limited to the manifest errors of assessment in the evaluation of 
the Commission. The judgment of the GC was subsequently appealed, pro-
viding the opportunity to the ECJ to reconsider the scope of the judicial 
review on this matter.
The ECJ held that that evaluation of the Commission could not be excluded 
from review by the EU judicature, as doing so would risk undermining 
62 Judgment of 18 June 2015, Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v. European Commission, C-583/13, 
EU:C:2015:404 paragraphs 38 and ff. 
63 Judgment of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v. European Commission, C-415/15 
P, EU:C:2017:216.
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the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47.64 In par-
ticular, the ECJ addressed the question of whether the Commission’s letter 
under Article 17 of Regulation 659/1999 could be challenged before EU 
courts. This document is considered an intermediate measure before the 
adoption of a final decision by the Commission on whether a measure con-
stitutes State aid. The Court observed that “Since the Article 17 letter con-
stitutes a first step in the preparation of the decision at issue, the appellants 
may not be prevented from invoking the unlawfulness of the assessment 
contained in that letter in support of their action against that decision”.65 
The judgment in Stichting Woonpunt is one of judicial empowerment as 
it extends the scrutiny of the EU judicature on intermediate acts of the 
Commission jointly with the Commission’s final decision. This decision 
also empowers corporations to invoke the unlawfulness of intermediate 
acts issued by the Commission.
The issue of the scope of the judicial review of the EU courts is particu-
larly complex concerning the principle of ne ultra petita. According to this 
principle, courts adopt a passive stance towards the cases brought before 
them and decide based only on the pleas submitted by the parties. This 
principle ensures procedural efficiency and puts on individuals the burden 
to ask precisely what they want the judge to adjudicate upon. The bur-
den of challenge on the parties is mitigated by the possibility for courts to 
raise pleas of their own motion, for example, on ordre public issues. In this 
regard, the British Airways appeal66 reaffirmed that the ECJ cannot grant 
an annulment that goes beyond that sought by the applicant. The Court 
relied on the principle of res judicata and the effects of the proceedings 
under Article 263 of the TFEU to exclude the annulment of the parts of 
EU acts that were not challenged.67 As a result, the ECJ found that the GC 
was correct in annulling only the part of the decision that was challenged 
at first instance.
64 Ibid, paragraph 39.
65 Ibid, paragraph 48.
66 Judgment of 14 November 2017, British Airways plc v. European Commission, C-122/16, 
EU:C:2017:861.
67 Ibid, paragraph 82.
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(c) The review of penalties by the European Union judicature
With regard to the penalties for infringements of EU competition law, 
Article 9(3) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that, in fixing the amount of 
the fine, the Commission should consider the gravity and the duration 
of the infringement.68 Under Articles 31 of the same Regulation and 261 
TFEU, the CJEU has “unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby 
the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may can-
cel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed”69. 
Although the Commission is not a tribunal in the meaning employed in 
Article 47 Charter, the severity of the fines requires the application of the 
right to a fair hearing to the procedures concerning infringements of the 
competition rules applicable to undertakings.70 Judgments concerning the 
review of fines offer interesting reflections on the role of penalties as a form 
of effective sanction (and remedy), the procedural duties of the parties 
involved in the review and the division of judicial competences between 
EU courts.
Notably, the rights included in Article 47 Charter have influenced the 
standards of review applied for antitrust penalties. The role of Article 
47 in this respect became evident in Saint-Gobain.71 The case originated 
from a decision of the Commission sanctioning a set of anti-competitive 
agreements and concerted practices in the EEA car glass sector. Having 
challenged the Commission’s decision, Saint-Gobain submitted before 
the GC that the judicial review of fines by the EU courts is not “truly” 
unlimited, as those courts constrain themselves to identifying manifest 
errors of assessment or the misuse of powers. Another element hinder-
ing the unlimited review of sanctions, according to Saint-Gobain, is that 
the action for annulment does not have suspensory effect vis-à-vis the fine 
decision. In its decision on the matter, the GC held that judicial review 
of the Commission’s decisions is complemented by the unlimited review 
on antitrust penalties. This system offers effective judicial protection as 
68 It should be noted that the ECHR case law has established that administrative authorities, such 
as the Commission, may impose criminal penalties. However, to counterbalance these sanction-
ing powers, judicial review cannot be limited to the procedural legality of the decision to impose 
penalties but should consider also the proportionality of the technical choices of the competition 
authority. See A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy (2011), no. 43509/08.
69 Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003.
70 Judgment of 27 March 2014, Saint-Gobain Glass France and Others v. European Commission, 
T56/09 and T73/09, EU:T:2014:160, paragraph 82.
71 Ibid, paragraphs 79-80.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   185 28/10/2020   23:06:56
186  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 169-204
it allows EU courts, in particular, to substitute their assessment for that 
of the Commission and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the 
fine or periodic penalty payment imposed.72 When reviewing fines, the 
EU judicature does not limit itself to marginal scrutiny but engages in a 
substantive review in light of several factors. These standards of judicial 
review ensure compliance with the principle of effective judicial review. 
Nevertheless, the Court did not develop on the absence of suspensory 
effects when lodging an action of annulment against penalties.
In Hanse & Rosenthal,73 the ECJ further developed on the judicial review 
of penalties under Article 47. In particular, in the exercise of its unlim-
ited jurisdiction with regard to a fine, the EU judicature is bound, under 
Articles 261, 263 TFEU and 47 Charter, to examine all complaints based 
on issues of fact and law that seek to show that the amount of the fine is not 
commensurate with the gravity or the duration of the infringement.74 The 
GC can also carry out its own assessment on the imposition of fines when 
it does not find any element alleging illegality of the Commission’s deci-
sion.75 In any event, if the GC does not consider on its own motion the fines 
under the principles of proportionality, legality and equal treatment, there 
will be no breach of the principle of effective judicial protection.76 One 
might wonder whether the possibility of the EU judicature not to scruti-
nise of its own motion the proportionality of the penalties is in line with 
the Menarini jurisprudence.
The ECJ provided further guidance as to the division of competencies 
between the GC at first instance and that of the ECJ on appeal concern-
ing fines in the Villeroy appeal.77 The ECJ recalled that under Article 47, 
the GC is solely competent to examine how the Commission assessed the 
gravity of unlawful conduct and the amount of penalties. The ECJ further 
72 Ibid, paragraph 120. This was confirmed in Judgment of 9 June 2016, Repsol Lubricantes y 
Especialidades and Others v. European Commission, C-617/13, EU:C:2016:416.
73 Judgment of 16 February 2016, Hansen & Rosenthal and H&R Wax Company Vertrieb v. 
European Commission, C-90/15, EU:C:2017:123.
74 See Judgment of 1 February 2018, Deutsche Bahn and Others v. European Commission, 
C-264/16, EU:C:2018:60; Judgment 18 December 2014, European Commission v. Parker Hannifin 
Manufacturing et Parker-Hannifin, C-434/13 P, EU:C:2014:2456, paragraph 75.
75 See Order of 7 July 2016 Westfälische Drahtindustrie GmbH et al v. European Commission, 
C-523/15, EU:C:2016:541. 
76 Judgment of 22 October 2015, AC-Treuhand AG v. European Commission, C-194/14, 
EU:C:2015:717, paragraph 77. 
77 Judgment of 26 January 2017, Villeroy and Boch SAS v. European Commission, C-644/13, 
EU:C:2017:59.
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posited that the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction concerns solely the pen-
alty imposed “and not the entirety of the contested decision”.78 The GC 
is thus not required to raise pleas of its own motion, as the unlimited 
jurisdiction concerning fines is not equivalent to an own-motion review.79 
Except for public policy grounds, it is the parties’ responsibility to raise 
pleas in law against the first instance decision and adduce relevant evi-
dence. The fact that EU courts do not review in entirety the case of their 
own motion is not contrary to the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion.80 Therefore, the parties have the burden to challenge all aspects of 
penalties they wish to annul. They must offer sufficiently clear and precise 
information to enable the defendant to prepare its case and allow the court 
to decide on the matter.81
Regarding the role of the ECJ on appeal, the Court focuses its review 
on two questions. First, “to what extent the GC took into consideration, 
in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of 
particular conduct in the light of Article 101 [of the] TFEU and Article 23 
of Regulation No 1/2003 and, second, […] whether the GC responded to a 
sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised in support of the claim 
for reduction of the fine”.82
Concerning the first assessment, the ECJ83 must evaluate whether the 
GC paid sufficient attention to different factors, such as, among others, 
the conduct of the undertaking, the profit that the companies were able to 
derive from it, the value of goods concerned and the threat that infringe-
ments pose to the objective of the EU. Although the financial situation 
of the applicants is not a criterion for the review of a fine, an undertak-
ing’s ability to pay can be relevant only in a specific social context, namely, 
when the fine can lead to an increase in unemployment or a deterioration 
in the economic sectors upstream and downstream of the undertaking 
78 Ibid, paragraph 75.
79 Ibid.
80 Judgment of 28 June 2016, Portugal Telecom SGPS, SA v. Commission, T-208/13, EU:T:2016:368, 
paragraph 275. For an analysis of this case, see Catarina Vieira Peres “Developments in the case 
law of the EU courts in competition law in 2016”, Market and Competition Law Review I, no. 1 
(2017): 197 and ff.
81 Ibid, paragraph 270.
82 Judgment of 26 January 2017, Villeroy and Boch SAS v. European Commission, C-644/13, 
EU:C:2017:59, paragraph 72.
83 See Judgment of 8 December 2011, KME Germany AG et al v. European Commission, C-272/09 
C, EU:C:2011:810.
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concerned.84 Yet the ECJ cannot substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own 
assessment for that of the GC when the latter court exercises its unlim-
ited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of competition fines imposed on 
undertakings.85 The ECJ may nevertheless find that an error of law has 
been committed by the GC when the level of the “penalty is not merely 
inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate”.86
In light of these parameters, in Villeroy, the ECJ observed that the GC 
did not limit itself to ruling on the legality of the amount but also reviewed 
the fine in light of the gravity of the infringement. Moreover, the ECJ noted 
that the infringement committed by the company, which included “hori-
zontal price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation agreements, 
which [were typically] secret, [were] […] among the most harmful restric-
tions of competition”. Consequently, the ECJ found that the GC had cor-
rectly scrutinised the fines imposed by the Commission.87
Villeroy is a significant judgment, as it confirms that the GC is the main 
court in charge of this review, due to its competence to assess the facts in 
addition to the law of the cases. At the same time, the ECJ has also sig-
nificant leeway for detecting errors committed by the GC in this context. 
To do so, an implicit assessment of the fines may be inevitable. One may 
wonder whether in case the ECJ identifies an error of law by the GC in 
the review of fines, the former court could give the final judgment88 and 
thus itself pronounce on the amount of penalties.89 It is submitted that the 
answer to this question depends on the type of assessment that the ECJ 
would have to carry. According to the division of competencies between 
the GC and the ECJ, only in case of “non-complex” assessment can the ECJ 
pronounce its final decision.90
84 See Order of 7 July 2016, Westfälische Drahtindustrie GmbH v. European Commission, C-523/15, 
EU:C:2016:541, paragraph 46; Judgment of 29 June 2006, SGL Carbon v. Commission of the 
European Communities, C-308/04 P, EU:C:2006:433 paragraph 106.
85 Judgment of 26 January 2017, Villeroy and Boch SAS v. European Commission, C-644/13, 
EU:C:2017:59, paragraph 184.
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, paragraph 188. However, the excessive duration of administrative proceedings may breach 
the right of defence of the companies. The ECJ further held that the excessive duration of the 
administrative procedure before the Commission cannot lead to the reduction of fines imposed.
88 Article 61 ECJ Statute.
89 This occurred in pre-Lisbon case law and before the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, e.g. 
Baustahlgewebe GmbH discussed below.
90 See Giulia Gentile, “The ECJ as the EU Court of Appeal: Some evidence from the appeal case-law 
on the non-contractual liability of the EU”, Review of European Administrative Law 13, no. 1 (2020).
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Finally, in Schenker,91 the ECJ evaluated on appeal whether the GC had 
paid sufficient attention to the harm caused by the sanctioned infringe-
ment when reviewing the amount of penalties imposed, as required by 
Article 47. The ECJ confirmed the first instance judgment by stating that 
the role of fines is that of “general deterrence” and, accordingly, may not 
exactly reproduce the economic harm “which has been, or which may have 
been caused by the cartel concerned”.92 As a result, the Commission is not 
obliged to impose penalties that reflect the economic harm caused in the 
form of the surcharges levied; however, it can take into account the value 
of sales of goods or services to which the infringement directly or indi-
rectly relates.93
Overall, building on the unlimited jurisdiction stemming from Article 
261 TFEU, both the GC and the ECJ apply rather intense scrutiny on the 
matter under the aegis of Article 47. Through its review, the EU judicature 
may determine whether the fines imposed are effective sanctions and thus 
protect the general interest in a fair competition.
(d) The excessive duration of proceedings and effective remedies
According to Article 47(2) of the Charter, a fair trial includes reaching 
a final decision within a reasonable time. Interestingly, the principle of 
“reasonable duration” stemming from Article 47 is also applicable in the 
context of administrative procedures relating to competition policy before 
the Commission.94 A series of judgements in the field of competition liti-
gation addressed what constitutes a “reasonable duration” of proceedings 
under Article 47.
In Baustahlgewebe GmbH,95 which was decided before the entry into 
force of the Charter, the ECJ relied on procedural economy grounds to 
annul on appeal a GC’s decision in breach of a reasonable duration of pro-
ceedings. Contextually, to redress this violation by the GC, the ECJ reduced 
the amount of the fines imposed by the Commission on an undertaking. 
91 Judgment of 1 February 2018, Schenker Ltd v. European Commission, C-263/16, EU:C:2018:58.
92 Ibid, paragraph 65.
93 C-263/16 P – Schenker v. Commission. To the same effect see also Judgment of 1 February 2018, 
Kühne + Nagel International and Others v. Commission, C-261/16, EU:C:2018:56.
94 Judgment of 5 June 2012, Imperial Chemical Industries v. European Commission, T-214/06, 
EU:T:2012:275.
95 Judgment of 17 December 1998, Baustahlgewebe v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-185/95 P EU:C:1998:608.
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In the recent cases Kendrion96 and Gascogne,97 the ECJ reversed this case 
law. In these appeals, the ECJ had to consider, once again, a fine reduction 
claim following excessively long proceedings before the GC. Surprisingly, 
the ECJ declared as inadmissible pleas alleging the excessive duration of 
proceedings before the GC. It held that to sanction violations of Article 
47(2) of the Charter, parties should bring an afresh action for damages 
before the GC. The ECJ also laid down the principles to be followed by the 
GC in the assessment of the damage caused by the unreasonable dura-
tion of proceedings. Among these, the ECJ mentioned the complexity 
of the case, the dilatory conduct of the parties and the principle of legal 
certainty. The Court stressed that this list is not exhaustive and that the 
assessment must be carried out in light of the circumstances specific to the 
case. However, the EU judicature should not take into account the finan-
cial situation of the requesting party.98 The ECJ applied these principles 
in the cases at hand and found that the GC had breached the reasonable 
duration of the proceedings at first instance. Nonetheless, the plea had to 
be rejected since the competent court to adjudicate on damages caused by 
the excessive length of proceedings is the GC under Article 340 TFEU. 
Following Kendrion and Gascogne, pleas raised on appeal alleging the 
excessive length of proceedings have consistently been dismissed.99
The ECJ has also specified that the action for damages to sanction exces-
sively long proceedings should be assigned to a different chamber than 
the one that adjudicated in the first instance.100 In any event, the exces-
sive length of proceedings cannot lead to the annulment of the decision 
issued by the GC nor the reduction of the fine imposed:101 in the ECJ’s view, 
96 Judgment of 26 November 2013, Groupe Gascogne v. European Commission, C-58/12, 
EU:C:2013:770.
97 Judgment of 26 November 2013, Kendrion NV. v. European Commission, C-50/12, EU:C:2013:771.
98 Judgment of 26 November 2013, Kendrion NV. v. European Commission, C-50/12, EU:C:2013:771 
and Judgment of 26 November 2013, Groupe Gascogne v. European Commission, C-58/12, 
EU:C:2013:770, paragraphs 99 and ff.
99 See Judgment of 14 September 2016, Trafilerie Meridionali v. European Commission, C-519/15 P, 
EU:C:2016:682, paragraph 62, Judgment of 26 January 2017, Aloys F. Dornbracht v. European 
Commission, C-604/13, EU:C:2017:45, paragraph 97, Judgment 12 January 2017, Timab Industries 
and Cie financière et de participations Roullier (CFPR) v. European Commission, C-411/15 P, 
EU:C:2017:11, paragraph 165.
100 Judgment of 26 November 2013, Groupe Gascogne v. European Commission, C-58/12, 
EU:C:2013:770, paragraph 90.
101 See Judgment of 14 September 2016, Ori Martin v. European Commission, C-490/15, 
EU:C:2016:678 paragraph 116; Judgment of 9 October 2014, ICF v. European Commission, 
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the annulment cannot remedy the violation of the reasonable duration 
requirement.102 Furthermore, although parties are not requested to adduce 
any additional evidence on appeal when lamenting an excessive duration 
of the proceedings, the ECJ may note the occurred violation. Parties are 
also exonerated from adducing further evidence in a new action for dam-
ages before the GC in case the ECJ confirms on appeal the presence of a 
violation of Article 47(2).103
(e) Statement of reasons 
It is well established that Article 47 Charter and the principle of effec-
tive judicial protection are linked to the duty of EU institutions to pro-
vide a statement of reasons in their acts.104 The statement of reason ensures 
double protection, as it allows individuals to challenge the grounds of a 
decision adopted by the EU institutions and permits EU courts to exercise 
their judicial review over EU acts.
In the context of competition law, Article 47 “requires that the opera-
tive part of a decision […] by the Commission […] must be particularly 
clear and precise and that the undertakings held liable […] must be in a 
position to understand and to contest that imputation of liability and the 
imposition of those penalties, as set out in the wording of that operative 
part”.105 The Commission should specify the nature, the extent of the sanc-
tioned infringement and the liable entities.106 This information is neces-
sary to treat requests for damages following the infringement. Only when 
the operative part is unclear can the statement of reasons contained in a 
decision be considered.107
The Club Hotel Loutraki108 offers insights on the duty to state reasons on 
the part of the Commission under Article 47. The case stemmed from a 
C-467/13 paragraphs 55-61; Judgment of 9 June 2016, PROAS v. European Commission, C-616/13 
P, EU:C:2016:415, paragraphs 81-86; Judgment of 5 June 2012, Imperial Chemical Industries v. 
European Commission, T-214/06, EU:T:2012:275, paragraphs 286-287.
102 Judgment of 9 June 2016, CEPSA v. European Commission, C-608/13, EU:C:2016:414, para-
graph 71.
103 Ibid.
104 Article 296 TFEU.
105 Judgment of 12 July 2019, Sony Optiarc and Sony Optiarc America v. European Commission, 
T-763/15, EU:T:2019:517, paragraph 225.
106 Judgment of 16 December 2015, Air France v. European Commission, T-63/11, EU:T:2015:993.
107 Ibid.
108 Judgment of 21 December 2016, Club Hotel Loutraki AE et al. v. European Commission, C-131/15 
P, EU:C:2016:989.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   191 28/10/2020   23:06:56
192  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 169-204
notification by the Greek authorities of measures in favour of Club Hotel 
Loutraki. The Commission concluded that the notified arrangements did 
not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The 
matter was brought before the EU judicature. On appeal, the appellants 
submitted that the GC erred in considering that the Commission had not 
infringed the duty to state reasons. For our analysis, it should be noted that 
the Commission had redacted almost all economic evaluations; for this 
reason, the applicants argued that they could not effectively challenge the 
Commission’s decision.
The ECJ concurred with the GC and held that the breach of the state-
ment of reasons by the Commission was not proved.109 In the opinion of 
the Court, the appellants had failed to explain the importance of the omit-
ted data from the non-confidential version of the decision. The absence of 
economic data did not impede the applicants from understanding the rea-
soning followed by the Commission nor did it hinder their ability to chal-
lenge that decision before the Court and the possibility for the EU courts 
to ensure effective judicial protection. This outcome is surprising, since 
the exclusion of economic data may limit the possibility for third parties 
to challenge the details of the Commission’s decision. Moreover, the duty 
to prove the usefulness of non-disclosed economic data can amount to a 
probatio diabolica.
(f) Evidence
Evidence in competition law is of essence. As stated by Kalintiri, “evi-
dence standards constitute an intrinsic element of what makes a trial 
‘fair’”.110 The burden of proof for the Commission and the parties involved 
in competition infringement proceedings was delineated in several 
decisions.
First, in Hanse & Rosenthal,111 the ECJ established that while the 
Commission must submit proof of violations, the company must raise a 
defence against the finding of a breach of competition rules to provide evi-
dence that the conditions for applying the rule from which this defence 
was deduced had been met. If the parties meet the required evidence 
109 Ibid, paragraph 55.
110 Andriani Kalintiri, Evidence Standards in EU Competition Enforcement (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2019), 2.
111 Judgment of 16 February 2017, Hansen & Rosenthal and H&R Wax Company Vertrieb v. 
European Commission v. European Commission, C-90/15, EU:C:2017:123.
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thresholds, the Commission will have to resort to other evidence to estab-
lish an infringement. Moreover, the factual elements relied on, either by 
the Commission or a company should be such as to oblige the other party 
to provide an explanation or justification, failing which it is permissible to 
conclude that the rules on the burden of proof have been satisfied.
Furthermore, in Siemens AG,112 the ECJ recalled its established case law 
according to which the Commission should (in compliance with the right 
to a fair hearing) allow the parties involved in the infringement proceed-
ings to make known their views on the facts, objections and circumstances 
put forward by the Commission. However, in an administrative procedure 
such as that provided for infringements in the field of competition law, the 
Commission is not obliged to allow cross-examination of the witnesses it 
heard. Companies can challenge the legitimate refusal of the Commission 
to allow such cross-examination before the GC. It will be for the EU 
courts, which enjoy the maximum discretion in this area, to assess the rel-
evance of the application to the subject matter of the dispute and the need 
to examine the witnesses named.
The Commission is also in charge of deciding the relevance of access 
to the evidence used in competition infringements.113 However, if a docu-
ment in the Commission’s possession that may be categorised as exculpa-
tory evidence for an undertaking is not communicated to that company, 
the latter’s defence rights are infringed if it shows that the document at 
issue could have been useful for its defence. Therefore, applicants alleg-
ing a breach of the right to a defence because of a violation of the right 
to access documents must provide prima facie evidence that undisclosed 
documents will be useful to their defence.
In H&R, the GC also held that Article 47 does not grant an absolute 
right to admit a witness. The right to a fair process merely includes the 
possibility for the suspect to contest, adequately and sufficiently, the allega-
tion presented against him.114 Concurrently, the GC adopted an extensive 
interpretation of the right to use “unlawful” evidence by the Commission. 
In Goldfish BV,115 the GC held that evidence lawfully obtained by the 
112 Judgment of 19 December 2013, Siemens v. European Commission, C-239/11, EU:C:2013:866, 
paragraphs 318 and ff.
113 Judgment of 12 July 2018, NKT Verwaltungs GmbH v. European Commission, T-447/14, 
EU:T:2018:443.
114 Judgment of 16 February 2017, Hansen & Rosenthal and H&R Wax Company Vertrieb v. 
European Commission, C-95/15, EU:C:2017:125.
115 Judgment of 8 September 2016, Goldfish and Others v. Commission, T-54/14, EU:T:2016:455.
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Commission, which may have been previously gathered unlawfully by 
third parties, could be relied upon. According to the GC, the use of unlaw-
ful evidence did not contravene, in the context of criminal proceedings, 
the fairness requirement established in Article 6 ECHR, protecting the 
right to a fair trial. This latter provision shapes the interpretation of Article 
47 Charter.116
The question about the evidence that must be used in infringement pro-
ceedings is intertwined with the presumption of innocence. This proce-
dural guarantee becomes particularly relevant in relation to infringement 
of competition rules, which can result in severe penalties.117 In this respect, 
it should be noted that the GC has considered this presumption as stem-
ming from Article 47, despite Article 48 of the Charter laying down the 
right to a defence. Interestingly, parties can obtain an annulment from EU 
courts of the Commission’s decisions finding infringement if they can dis-
prove alleged anti-competitive behaviour. However, in recent cases the ECJ 
has reaffirmed that the evidence to be used by the Commission must meet 
certain threshold of accuracy.118 Yet, the rule remain that companies are 
de facto presumed guilty, at least in relation to 102 TFEU infringements.119
4.  Fairness in the field of competition law under Article 47:  
an assessment
The considered case law confirms that fundamental rights are increasingly 
dominant in the enforcement of EU competition law and are shaping the 
standards regarding fairness in the EU competition framework. The anal-
ysis of the EU case law further highlights the significant impact of Article 
47 Charter in the enforcement of EU competition law.120 This provision has 
provided manifold contributions to the enforcement of EU competition 
law, both from a procedural and substantive fairness perspective.
From a procedural perspective, Article 47 has been used to clarify the 
procedural guarantees and obligations of corporations, in parallel with 
the duties of the European Commission and the judicial review by EU 
courts. From a substantive perspective, Article 47 Charter has furthered 
116 Ibid, paragraph 144.
117 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. European Commission, T-286/09, EU:T:2014:547, paragraph 63.
118 Judgment of 28 November 2019, ABB Ltd. and ABB AB v. European Commission, C-593/18, 
EU:C:2019:1027.
119 Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v. European Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632
120 This view is shared by Andreangeli, “Competition law”.
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the opportunity for individuals to obtain judicial protection and, accord-
ingly, effective remedies. In addition, this provision has strengthened EU 
courts’ competence regarding the unlimited review of fines, thereby con-
tributing to one of the most significant areas for the enforcement of EU 
competition law.
4.1. Article 47 and procedural fairness
In terms of procedural fairness, under Article 47 companies should sub-
mit comprehensive evidence to disprove the finding of the Commission 
concerning the infringement of competition rules.121 Notably, this also 
includes explaining how the information or document not shared by the 
Commission would have been helpful to discharge the company.122 In 
other words, applicants alleging a breach of the right to a defence because 
of a violation of the right to access documents must provide prima facie 
evidence that undisclosed documents will be useful to their defence. 
However, companies are de facto presumed guilty, as they have to disprove 
the evidence submitted by the Commission, in particular, in cases relat-
ing to Article 102 TFEU. In particular, they will have to demonstrate how 
the infringement did not take place. This may require a probatio diabol-
ica, and demonstrating how unknown information may have been useful 
for protecting the position of corporations. Merely raising the possibility 
that the evidence used by the Commission is incomplete will not be suf-
ficient for shielding the liability of the parties.123 Therefore, corporations 
do not enjoy a presumption of innocence. Whether this is compatible with 
Article 48 Charter is controversial. This has been the subject of several 
criticisms in the literature.124 The following observations shall be made 
in this regard. First, such a high evidence threshold under Article 47 for 
companies reflects the powerful role of the Commission in the competi-
tion field. Second, the fundamental rights of legal and not natural enti-
ties are at stake. The extent to which corporations should receive the same 
121 Judgment of 16 February 2017, Hansen & Rosenthal and H&R Wax Company Vertrieb v. 
European Commission, C-90/15, EU:C:2017:123.
122 Judgment of 12 July 2018, NKT Verwaltungs GmbH v. European Commission, T-447/14, 
EU:T:2018:443.
123 Judgment of 21 December 2016, Club Hotel Loutraki AE et al. v. European Commission, C-131/15 
P, EU:C:2016:989.
124 Aidan O’ Neill, “Competition law”; Bronckers and Vallery, “No longer presumed guilty?”.
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protection, as natural persons remain debatable.125 Possible drawbacks of 
extending the protection granted to natural persons to corporations are 
both practical and philosophical: if companies are provided with the same 
legal guarantees as natural individuals, the latter will be deprived of their 
“special” protection and position in society through human rights. It is the 
view of the author that the application of fundamental rights to legal enti-
ties should bear in mind the very nature of these bodies and ensure that 
the position of the natural individual in the society is protected.
Furthermore, Article 47 does not entitle obtaining the total annulment 
of the Commission’s acts when some aspects of these measures have not 
been challenged.126 Consequently, corporations will have to submit all 
pleas they wish to raise, since they cannot rely on the ex officio powers of 
the Court. Additionally, companies enjoy a (restrained) right to be heard 
in the context of infringement proceedings.127
Regarding the Commission, Article 47 imposes several procedural duties 
but also allows broad discretionary powers. Although this institution is 
not a tribunal for Article 47, it is subject to the respect of the guarantees 
stemming from that Article, also when carrying its investigations.128 First, 
due to the seriousness of the fines it can impose, the right to a fair hear-
ing applies to Commission proceedings in the field of competition law.129 
In principle, as required under the right to a fair trial, this institution 
should afford the possibility for the parties involved to be heard. However, 
in case the Commission does not allow the right to be heard to the par-
ties, said parties may nevertheless obtain judicial protection through the 
challenging of its decisions in compliance with Article 47.130 Second, the 
Commission should also comply with Article 47 in the adoption of 
final decisions, specifically, when drafting the operative part of the final 
125 Peter Oliver, “Companies and their fundamental rights: A comparative perspective”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 64, no. 3 (2015): 661, Anna Grear, Redirecting 
Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity (United Kingdom: Palgrave 
Macmillan Limited 2010); Graells and Marcos, “The EU’s accession”.
126 Judgment of 14 November 2017, British Airways v. European Commission, C-122/16, 
EU:C:2017:861.
127 Ibid.
128 Judgment of 27 March 2014, Saint-Gobain Glass France and Others v. European Commission, 
T56/09 and T73/09, EU:T:2014:160.
129 Ibid.
130 Judgment of 18 June 2015, Deutsche Bahn and Others v. European Commission, C-583/13, 
EU:C:2015:404.
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decisions, which must be clear and include a series of elements.131 However, 
Article 47 does not restrict the Commission’s wide discretion regarding 
the evidence to be used to prove anticompetitive behaviours.132 This insti-
tution may even use evidence lawfully obtained but previously gathered by 
a third party in breach of fundamental rights.133 
Concerning the EU courts, Article 47 does not require the EU judicature 
to have an active role in providing justice but merely to adjudicate upon 
pleas submitted by the parties.134 Furthermore, as the ECJ observed, the 
fact that EU courts do not consider, of their own motion, all aspects of 
the possible illegality of fines or the challenged decisions does not lead 
to violations of Article 47 Charter.135 However, the EU judicature has 
been reluctant to ensure procedural fairness when it comes to the exces-
sive duration of proceedings.136 The EU courts have argued that the rights 
stemming from Article 47(2) may be protected only via a new action before 
the GC and not as on appeal.137 Procedurally speaking, the evidence to be 
submitted by the parties will be limited if the ECJ already observed, in a 
precedent appeal, that the GC had objectively concluded the proceedings 
in an unreasonable time.138 Yet, while violations have been acknowledged, 
ultimate decisions granting compensation due to the conduct of the GC 
have not been issued to date. This was due to the application of a manifest 
error threshold when assessing the conduct of the GC.139 As a result, the 
EU judicature may negatively affect the perception of the public and the 
parties involved in proceedings regarding the effectiveness of the decision-
making processes of the Luxembourg judges. This is an area in which the 
current interpretation of Article 47 Charter does not match the procedural 
fairness aspirations stemming from that very provision.
131 Judgment of 12 July 2019, Sony Optiarc and Sony Optiarc America v. Commission, T-763/15, 
EU:T:2019:517, paragraph 225.
132 Judgment of 12 July 2018, NKT Verwaltungs GmbH v. European Commission, T-447/14, 
EU:T:2018:443.
133 Judgment of 8 September 2016, Goldfish and Others v. European Commission T-54/14, 
EU:T:2016:455.
134 Judgment of 14 November 2017, British Airways v. European Commission, C-122/16, 
EU:C:2017:861.
135 Judgment of 22 October 2015, AC-Treuhand v. Commission, C-194/14, EU:C:2015:717.
136 For example, Judgment 13 December 2018, European Union v. Gascogne Sack Deutschland and 
Gascogne, C-138/17 P, EU:C:2018:1013.
137 Ibid.
138 Judgment of 9 June 2016, CEPSA v. European Commission, C-608/13, EU:C:2016:414.
139 Gentile, “The ECJ”, 100. 
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4.2. Article 47 and substantive fairness
From a substantive fairness perspective, Article 47 Charter has contrib-
uted to strengthening effective remedies in the field of EU competition law. 
This provision has influenced the possibility of obtaining judicial protec-
tion before EU courts concerning a broad range of Commission’s acts. The 
EU Courts are also required under Article 47 to verify that the evidence 
used by the Commission in economic matters is factually accurate.140 
Although this provision cannot relax the admissibility and locus standi 
requirements of Article 263 TFEU,141 Article 47 was interpreted by EU 
courts to allow annulment not only of the Commission’s decisions but also 
of the evidence relied upon by that institution. This is a crucial evolution 
in the EU competition law system: individuals are now better positioned 
to address infringement proceedings before the EU courts. The principle 
of effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 allows challenging, 
among others, the decisions of the Commission concerning investiga-
tions142 and the preliminary acts of State aid investigations jointly with the 
Commission’s final decisions.143
Furthermore, the ECJ has established that the GC is the competent court 
to redress violations of Article 47(2) Charter through the action for dam-
ages (Article 340 TFEU).144 It should be noted, however, that this recent 
jurisprudence reversed previous case law that entitled parties to allege a 
violation of excessively long proceedings before the GC during appeal pro-
ceedings before the ECJ , without bringing a new claim under Article 340 
TFEU. As such, this new case law is more restrictive and reduces proce-
dural economy guarantees for corporations.
Another area where Article 47 has contributed to the enhancement of 
substantive fairness is the review of fines for anticompetitive conducts. 
Fines are one of the tools used by the Commission to sanction anti-com-
petitive conducts. Their role is therefore deterrent and additional to the 
structural and behavioural remedies that the Commission may impose 
140 Judgment of 6 November 2012, Europese Germeenschap v. Otis and Others, C-199/11, 
EU:C:2012:684.
141 See Order of 10 October 2017, Greenpeace Energy v. European Commission, C-640/16 P, 
EU:C:2017:752.
142 Judgment of 18 June 2015, Deutsche Bahn and Others v. European Commission, C-583/13, 
EU:C:2015:404.
143 Judgment of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v. European Commission, C-415/15 
P, EU:C:2017:216.
144 Judgment of 26 November 2013, Kendrion NV. v. European Commission, C-50/12, EU:C:2013:771.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   198 28/10/2020   23:06:56
199Two Strings to One Bow? | Giulia Gentile
on undertakings for competition infringements.145 In this sense, penalties 
may be conceptualised as a form of remedy to protect the general interest 
of the EU in a fair competition within the internal market. The substantive 
review of fines, demanded under Regulation 1/2003 and Article 261 TFEU, 
is instrumental for ensuring effective judicial review, one of the essential 
components of the principle of effective judicial protection as enshrined 
in Article 47 Charter. Notably, the GC is in charge of carrying out an in-
depth analysis of the appropriateness of the penalties to provide an effec-
tive review.146 On appeal, the ECJ considers whether the GC has paid suf-
ficient attention to the different factors related to the review of a fine and 
whether the GC sufficiently argued its decision to review or modify the 
fine.147 Although the ECJ cannot substitute the GC findings on grounds 
of fairness, it can find that that GC committed an error when two condi-
tions are met, i.e. penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive 
to the point of being disproportionate.148 While the EU courts have been 
criticised for leaving a significant margin of discretion to the Commission 
in terms of imposing, for example, commitments,149 the review of penal-
ties enables substantive fairness considerations. The EU judicature can 
indeed balance the amount of the fine with the infringement proved by 
the Commission, and amend the penalty imposed, if necessary. 
To avoid infringing both Article 47 requirements and the objectives of 
substantive fairness in competition fields, the EU courts should not hesi-
tate to express their views on the activity of the Commission when setting 
fines. This role of the EU courts is even more important in light of the 
deterrent role of these penalties and the fact that they constitute a form 
of “remedy” for violations of EU competition law. It is true that Article 47 
reinforces (and continues to reinforce) the unlimited jurisdiction of the EU 
judicature in the field of penalties review. One cannot, however, exclude 
a spill over effect in which substantive fairness considerations prompted 
by Article 47 Charter in the review of penalties may also extend to other 
remedial areas of EU competition enforcement. In this context, the com-
mitments imposed by the Commission may also be conceptualised as 
145 See Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003.
146 Judgment of 26 January 2017, Villeroy and Boch SAS v. Commission, C-644/13, EU:C:2017:59.
147 Ibid; Judgment of 1 February 2018 Schenker v. Commission, C-263/16 EU:C:2018:58.
148 Judgment of 3 September 2009, William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & 
Co. KG v. Commission of the European Communities, C-534/07 P, EU:C:2009:505, paragraph 86.
149 Ryan Stones, “Commitment decisions in EU competition enforcement: Policy effectiveness v. 
the formal rule of law”, Yearbook of European Law 38 (2019): 361-399.
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remedies protecting the general interest, and, as such, should be subject to 
in-depth judicial scrutiny by the EU courts.150
The right to an effective remedy under Article 47 should not, however, 
become void when it comes to sanctioning excessively long proceedings. 
The duty of the parties, as identified in recent case law, to bring a separate 
action for damages before the GC following the violation of Article 47(2) 
Charter is procedurally correct; it discharges the ECJ from reconsidering 
the facts of the case, which is left to the competence of the GC. Yet this new 
case law reduces the economic procedural guarantees in favour of indi-
viduals, who can now obtain redress for breaches of Article 47(2) only by 
lodging a new claim once the excessively long proceedings have been con-
cluded. More worryingly, at the time of writing, recent claims for damages 
for excessively long proceedings have been unsuccessful, even if breaches 
of Article 47(2) Charter were identified.151
It should also be noted that Article 47 Charter was further interpreted 
as requiring national authorities to effectively ensure the redress of vio-
lations of competition law via actions for damages.152 This requirement 
stems from Directive 2014/104, which regulates this type of action before 
national courts. In this context, national courts become the ultimate pro-
vider of effective remedies following the violation of EU competition rules. 
When granting such remedies, national judges should strictly cooper-
ate with the ECJ in setting the threshold of effective judicial protection 
required by Article 47.
Although the implications of Article 47 Charter are beneficial for 
increasing the overall fairness of the enforcement of EU competition law, 
this paper submits that there is scope for improvement. The EU courts 
should not miss the opportunity to make use of this provision to ensure the 
achievement of both procedural and substantive fairness in the enforce-
ment of EU competition law.
150 The use of Article 47 Charter “against” individuals.
151 See Judgment of 13 December 2018, European Union v. Gascogne Sack Deutschland and 
Gascogne, C-138/17 P EU:C:2018:1013.
152 Judgment of 6 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie and Others, C-536/11, 
EU:C:2013:366.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   200 28/10/2020   23:06:56
201Two Strings to One Bow? | Giulia Gentile
5. Conclusion
This paper discussed the contribution of Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to the enhancement of fairness in the enforcement of 
EU competition law. Prior to engaging in this analysis, the paper has illus-
trated various notions of fairness in reference to existing literature and 
legal areas. Broadly speaking, we may distinguish between “substantive” 
and “procedural” fairness. While the former guarantees that the overall 
impact of policies is democratically sound, i.e. acceptable to the commu-
nity of reference and with a general benefit for the citizens, procedural 
fairness is concerned with ensuring the effective participation of entities in 
decision-making processes. These two notions are encountered in the field 
of competition. In particular, substantive fairness aspirations are present 
in both legislative sources and in the political statements of the European 
Commission concerning competition matters. This notion is traditionally 
influenced by continental European traditions, whereby public authorities 
should ensure distributional fairness in the market. This involves protect-
ing those in a weaker position, in compliance with the principles of equal-
ity and non-discrimination. Procedural fairness also has a central role in 
EU competition law, since it ensures sound administrative conduct by the 
Commission and EU courts and the effective participation of corporations 
in reaching infringement decisions. Procedural fairness in the competi-
tion field is protected by various instruments, such as Regulation 1/2003 
and the Commission’s notices on procedural rights.
Against this background, this article has discussed the impact of Article 
47 of the Charter, being the most cited fundamental right in EU litiga-
tion on competition matters, in enhancing fairness in the enforcement 
of EU competition rules. There are six areas in which this provision was 
extensively applied, i.e. locus standi, the scope of the judicial review, the 
review of penalties, the excessive duration of proceedings, the duty to state 
reasons and evidence. The article has subsequently distinguished between 
the impact of this provision on procedural and substantive fairness in the 
competition field by reference to individuals, the Commission and the EU 
courts. The analysis confirmed the procedural contribution to fairness 
in the context of Article 47 in the competition field. However, interest-
ing findings as to the contribution of this provision towards achieving 
substantive fairness in the competition field were also presented. Notably, 
Article 47 Charter expands the possibility for reviewing the Commission’s 
acts, shapes the right to an effective remedy in conjunction with excessively 
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long proceedings, and strengthens substantive fairness considerations via 
the review of penalties conducted by EU courts, in particular, the GC. 
Overall, a possible spillover effect of Article 47 requirements regarding the 
review of penalties in other areas of EU competition is not implausible and 
should be strongly welcomed, based on the need for achieving substantive 
fairness in the field of EU competition law.
Bibliography
Ahlborn, Christian and A. Jorge Padilla. “From fairness to welfare: Implications 
for the assessment of unilateral conduct under EC competition law”. In European 
Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, edited by 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquise. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008.
Amato, Giuliano. Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy 
in the History of the Market. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997.
Andreangeli, Arianna. “Competition law and fundamental rights”. Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 8, no. 8 (2017): 524-538.
Arena, Amedeo. “The emergence of a WTO antitrust jurisprudence through cross-fertili-
zation from other international antitrust institutions: The case for procedural fairness 
as a necessary precondition”. In Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, edited 
by Paul Nihoul and Tadeusz Skonczny. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015.
Bronckers, Marco and Anne Vallery. “No longer presumed guilty? The impact of funda-
mental rights on certain dogmas of EU competition law”. World Competition 34, no. 
4 (2011): 535-570.
Buckley, Frank H. “Three theories of substantive fairness”. Hofstra Law Review 19, no. 
1 (1990): 33-66.
de Boer, Nik J. “Fundamental rights and the EU internal market: Just how fundamental 
are the EU treaty freedoms? A normative enquiry based on John Rawls’ political phi-
losophy”. Utrecht Law Review 9, no. 1 (2013): 148-168.
Edwards, C. D. Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An International Comparison. Dobbs 
Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1967.
Flattery, Jamie. “Balancing efficiency and justice in EU competition law: Elements of 
procedural fairness and their impact on the right of a fair hearing”. The Competition 
Law Review 7, no. 1 (2010): 53-81.
Forrester, Ian. “Modernization of EC competition law”. Fordham International Law 
Journal 23, no. 4 (2000): 1028-1088.
Gentile, Giulia. “The ECJ as the EU Court of Appeal: Some evidence from the appeal case-
law on the non-contractual liability of the EU”. Review of European Administrative 
Law 13, no. 1 (2020): 73-107.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   202 28/10/2020   23:06:56
203Two Strings to One Bow? | Giulia Gentile
Gerard, Damien. “Fairness in EU competition policy: Significance and implications”. 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9, no. 4 (2018): 211-212.
Graells, Albert Sanchez and Francisco Marcos. “Human rights’ protection for corpo-
rate antitrust defendants: Are we not going overboard?”. In Paul Nihoul and Tadeusz 
Skoczny, Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2015.
Grear, Anna. Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal 
Humanity. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 2010.
Harlow, Carol and Richard Rawlings. Process and Procedure in EU Administration. 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014.
Hesse, Renata. “And never the twain shall meet? Connecting popular and professional visions 
for antitrust enforcement”. 20 September 2016. https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
acting-assistant-attorney-general-renata-hesse-antitrust-division-delivers-opening.
Kalintiri, Andriani. Evidence Standards in EU Competition Enforcement. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2019.
Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell. “The conflict between notions of fairness and the 
pareto principle”. American Law and Economics Review 1, no. 1/2 (2000): 63-77.
Landini, Sara. “Private enforcement and market regulation”. Market and Competition 
Law Review II, no. 2 (2018): 47-70. 
Lianos, Ioannis. “Polycentric competition law”. Current Legal Problems 71, no. 1 (2018): 
161-213.
Lianos, Ioannis, Nicola Countouris and Valerio de Stefano. “Re-thinking the competi-
tion law/labour law interaction: Promoting a fairer labour market”. European Labour 
Law Journal 10, no. 3 (2019): 291-333.
Marco Colino, Sandra. “The antitrust F word: Fairness considerations in competition 
law”. Social Science Research Network, 2018. https://bit.ly/2Gd65I4.
Mullan, David J. “Natural justice and fairness – Substantive as well as procedural stand-
ards for the review of administrative decision-making?”. Revue de Droit de McGill 27, 
no. 2 (1981): 250-298.
Nazzini, Renato. The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective 
and Principles of Article 102. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Oliver, Peter. “Companies and their fundamental rights: A comparative perspective”. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 64, no. 3 (2015): 661-696.
O’Neill, Aidan. “Competition law and fundamental rights: Some unresolved issues”. May 2011. 
https://www.matrixlaw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/18_05_2011_02_37_13_
Aidan-ONeill-QC-COMPETITION-LAW-AND-FUNDAMENTAL-RIGHTS.pdf.
Peres, Catarina Vieira. “Developments in the case law of the EU Courts in competition 
law in 2016”. Market and Competition Law Review I, no. 1 (2017): 187-221.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   203 28/10/2020   23:06:56
204  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 169-204
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Harvard: Harvard College Press, 2005.
Sokol, D. Daniel and Andrew T Guzman. Antitrust Procedural Fairness. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2019.
Sokol, D. Daniel. “The new procedural fairness in competition law: Global develop-
ments”. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 10, no. 4 (2019): 197-198.
Stones, Ryan. “Commitment decisions in EU competition enforcement: Policy effective-
ness v. the formal rule of law”. Yearbook of European Law 38 (2019): 361-399. 
Sunstein, Cass R. “Two conceptions of procedural fairness”. Social Research: An 
International Quarterly 73, no. 2 (2006): 619-646.
Tyler, Tom R. “Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law”. Crime and 
Justice 30 (2003): 283-357. 
Ullrich, Hanns. The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which 
Competition? United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006.
Van Cleynenbreugel, Pieter. “Effectiveness through fairness? ‘Due process’ as an 
institutional precondition for effective decentralized EU competition law enforce-
ment”. 9th ASCOLA Conference Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition 
Proceedings. 2014. http://www.ascola-conference-2014.wz.uw.edu.pl/conference_
papers/VanCleynenbreugel.pdf. 
Zimmer, Daniel. The Goals of Competition Law. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   204 28/10/2020   23:06:56
